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Abstract 
 
Corruption, as a research topic, because of its very nature, tends not to be explicitly discussed. Further, empirically 
it is not easy to get “data” on, as respondents rarely discuss this topic, and neither would it be discussed in formal 
reports and presentations. It is thus elusive but still permeates widely and arguably significantly shapes the 
trajectories of ICT projects in developing countries. Often, from the West the view taken is that officials and 
bureaucrats in developing countries are corrupt and responsible for failures of ICT projects. Arguably, this is an 
incomplete view, as there are “networks of corruption” in play involving international donors, ICT vendors, 
politicians and other actors. Dynamics within these networks give voice to corruption within particular contexts. In 
this paper, the dynamics of corruption, including the “macro-micro” linkages are traced in the context of a ICT 
project (based on free software and implemented by a not for profit NGO) for the public health sector in an Indian 
state.  In trying to understand some of these dynamics of corruption, the paper contributes to research in IS  in 
developing countries in 2 ways: practically tracing the implications of corruption on project implementation; 
arguing for a more explicit consideration of corruption by researchers interested in building a richer contextual 
understanding of ICT project implementation in developing countries. 
 
Keywords: IS, politics, power, Corruption, LDCs, India, health management. 
 
Résumé 
 
La corruption est peu étudiée même si elle façonne fortement les projets de TIC dans les pays en voie de 
développement. Le point de vue occidental voit la corruption des bureaucrates comme source d’échec des projets. 
Cette vision est incomplète, du fait de l’existence de « réseaux de corruption » impliquant de nombreux acteurs. Ce 
papier étudie la dynamique des réseaux de corruption dans le contexte du secteur hospitalier d’un Etat indien. 
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Introduction 
 
The often used statement “information is power” is especially relevant in the contemporary context of Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) mediated interventions in our everyday lives. It is therefore no surprise that 
issues of politics and power impinging the design and use of ICT based applications have been widely articulated 
and analyzed in IS and organizational studies research (Markus 1983; Franz & Robey 1984; Lyytinen & Hirschheim 
1987; Nielsen 2003; Checkland & Scholes 1990; Orlikowski 1996; Hirschheim & Smithson 1998; Walsham 2001; 
Jasperson et al. 2002; Sahay & Avgerou 2002; Walsham & Sahay 2006).  
 
In this paper, we argue that corruption, monetary or otherwise, while constituting an important aspect of power and 
politics, although recognized by IS researchers (Keen 1981; Avgerou 2000; Keen et al. 2000; Heeks 2001; Ciborra 
2005; Krishna & Walsham 2005), is rarely explicitly discussed. Corruption is a social phenomenon, shaped by 
societies’ diverse norms and cultures (Philp 1997), and also with the disciplines of study such as political 
researchers and social scientists (Xin 2004; Warren 2005; Heywood 1997; Schmidt 2007). Kurer (2005) argues that 
definitions of corruption vary with public opinion, public office and public interest. A simple and practical definition 
in the modern era is inimical corruption arising from unsuited policies. Unsuitable policies usually result as decision 
makers, politicians and other owners of public offices deliberately distort economic policies to support and carry 
forward their own personal interests (Jain 2001), and compromise and infringe impartiality principles for realizing 
personal benefits (Kurer 2005).  
 
Corruption is a critical determinant of development projects (Scott 1972; Vanaik 1990; World Bank 1997; Waltzer 
1999; Evans & Rauch 2000; Varma 2004; Transparency International 2006), and crucially so in ICT projects in the 
public sector in less developed countries (LDCs). Contributing to this are reasons such as the weak systems of 
accountability in governments, the asymmetries of power and resources exercised by funding agencies, and the 
ambiguity of expertise where technical decisions are typically made by administrators. Mechnisms of corruption 
varies from “hard” to “soft” forms with various shades in between. “Hard” corruption  could involve the passing of 
money between two parties for the undue grant of a favor. Softer forms could involve for eample a senior decision 
maker in a developing country favoring the adoption of a particular technology over another, in exchange for a trip 
to a foreign country from where the technology is sourced, sponsored by the international funding agency (Rothstein 
& Teorell 2008). 
 
Corruption, while being an important contextual condition shaping the trajectory of ICT based projects in LDCs, yet 
has been studiously avoided by researchers (Heeks 1998, 2007; Byrne 2004). Further and arguably, the use of free 
and open source software (FOSS) in ICT projects may have quite unique implications on corruption processes. On 
one hand, the “freeness” of FOSS may help break some of the existing shackles of corruption by eliminating some 
of the money from the transaction equation. On the other hand, purchasers of software may resist this very 
elimination leading to the construction of other forms of corruption. The manner in which FOSS impinge on the 
dynamics of corruption remains an unexplored empirical question in the context of ICT projects in developing 
countries. Within this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to understand the dynamics of corruption in the context of 
FOSS based ICT projects in LDCs. Specifically, our empirical focus is on understanding how the processes of 
corruption shaped the trajectory of implementation of a FOSS based health management information system (HMIS) 
within the public health sector in an Indian state.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of research related to the 
prevalence and impacts of corruption in LDCs is presented. A brief outline of the empirical approach is outlined in 
Section 3, followed by the case study description in Section 4. The case analysis, focusing on the resistance offered 
to overcome corruption and the eventual failure of these efforts is described in Section 5, followed by some brief 
conclusions. 
 
Literature Review: Impacts of prevailing corruption in LDCs in ISD settings 
 
The World Bank describes corruption as the abuse of public office for private gains (World Bank 1997). Till 
recently, the World Bank, as well as several other prominent international donor agencies formally ignored 
highlighting of corruption concerns. For example, World Bank officials were officially refrained from using the 
word “corruption” in their official communications as well as other relevant project documents (Fritzes 2007). It was 
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around 1996 that these formal orders were cancelled and corruption started to be more explicitly discussed. The 
sources and conditions of corruption vary, such as the chasm between formal rules and actual practices, the political 
pressures within which administrators operate, and corruption being something that is informally seen as 
institutionally legitimate (Fritzen 2007). Ogus (2004) argued that the high level of corruption in LDCs is culturally 
embedded, and often not curtailed due to political associations of most law enforcement agencies. 
 
In the Indian public sector, corruption can be seen as a historical product of the British colonial legacy and the 
constructed bureaucratic structure led by the Indian Civil Service (ICS). This structure created a highly centralized 
system that was paternalistic in approach, considering the local communities to be ignorant and their institutions 
backward and inefficient. Drucker (1988) described this governance structure to be “flat,” where the country was 
divided into provinces with districts, each being headed by an ICS officer, called the District Collector (DC) 
responsible primarily for maximizing revenue collection and maintaining law and order. The “steel frame” of the 
British Raj created ICS structure was post-independence retained through the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 
whose members typically came from the elite group of society (Brown 1985). The IAS “retained the structure and 
style of its elitist forerunner” (Frankel 1978, p. 81) which even strengthened the policy of increasing state control 
over development processes (Mitra 1992), including in the health sector. In independent India, in which both the 
central and state governments are involved in development management and administration of more than 600 
districts, the flat organizational structure of colonial times has since given way to a system of top-down, hierarchical 
and compartmentalized governance (Walsham & Sahay 1999).  
 
Analysts like Pfeffer (1992) have argued that a key aspect contributing to institutional politics is the struggle over 
centralization and decentralization, the ambiguity around what goals are in question, and the inherent power 
asymmetries. Centralized efforts to introduce ISD in state and district work settings, including in the health sector, 
are often resisted by the line departments who have hitherto managed independently and see this as an effort to 
increase control and surveillance. Such centrally driven institutional approaches to promote ICTs tend to discourage 
efforts to make sense of locally meaningful ways of management, including in health services (Avgerou 2000). 
While international donors may espouse participatory and bottom up approaches in their planning documents, in 
practice efforts tend to be top down and centralized because of the requirements of the donors, the power of the 
bureaucracies, and various other issues such as infrastructure and capacity (Ciborra 2005). 
 
Over the years, IS researchers have emphasized the role of contextual conditions, such as of politics and social and 
to some extent of corrupt practices (Heeks 2007) in ISD implementation (Keen, 1981; Standing and Bavington 
1995). Corruption is diversely applied by politicians, high level administrators and business, “in which society is 
made a prey for the personal enrichment of the powerful few” (Sturges 2004, p. 1). In the context of ISD projects in 
the public sector of LDCs, Heeks argues that public servants make decisions “in their own interests rather than in the 
interests of the public,” leading to IS failures due to “centralisation, which make decision makers too remote and 
unaccountable from the locus of decision information and action (Heeks 1998, p. 2z). 
 
Heeks (2007) further argues the contextual conflicts between design setting and user perspectives on IS often cause 
failures of anti-corruption interventions due to the cultures and objectives of public servants embedded in these 
situations. Political interventions in these settings are frequently carried out under the disguise of formal 
bureaucracies (Avgerou 1990; Varma 2004). In post-independence India, the legislatures in the states as well as the 
centre have severely worn down the non-partisan nature of the bureaucracy (Vanaik 1990). Markus’s (1983) 
analysis of power and politics implicated in ISD implementation is relevant for the analysis of corruption in LDCs.  
Specifically relevant is the political strand of her  interactionist theory which argues that “resistance is explained as a 
product of the interaction of system design features with the inter-organizational distribution of power, defined 
either objectively, in terms of horizontal or vertical power dimensions, or subjectively, in terms of symbolism” (p. 
432). Politics and power inherently modulate the acceptance (or rejection) of ISD outcomes (Markus & Robey 1983, 
1988), which in a public sector context are dominantly shaped by structures around government practices (Aitken & 
Michel 1995), and “corruption is entrenched in the system” (Krishna & Walsham 2005, p. 135). 
 
Furthermore, software in itself adds unique dimensions to issues of corruption and politics. Firstly, in the act of 
acquiring software, we run into the usual intrigues of interests, procurement systems of tenders, financial benefits, 
pressures of donor communities, and vendors often promising more than what they can offer. There are further 
concerns around the deployment and use of the software tied up with issues around who will host it, who will 
control its use, where will the software be physically located, what kind of data gets entered and who has access to 
The Dynamics of Corruption and ICT Projects: Case Study from the Public Health System in India 
4 Twenty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, Paris 2008  
it, and other such issues inherently linked with issues of power and control. FOSS may further intervene in these 
issues in interesting ways such as by challenging existing tender based systems of procurement and by providing 
freedom to users to adopt the software without the usual costs of proprietary systems and their licensing restrictions. 
Whether FOSS based applications actually provides freedom from corruption or will the  purchasers of software find 
other ways to exercise corruption, is an empirically open question. 
 
As governments and policy makers are rapidly jumping on the bandwagon of FOSS to help bridge the digital divide, 
it is urgent that we empirically understand how such applications are accepted or not by government systems (of 
procurement, capacity building, valuing expertise etc). Power is inherently elusive (Jasperson et al. 2002), as its 
nuances are closely associated with evil and corruption (Keen 1981) and thus not explicitly discussed. Our analysis 
takes the view that corruption is an integral constituent of power and politics in organizations, and implicated in the 
interests and practices of government bureaucrats, international agencies, vendors and others. The public health 
sector in LDCs is especially prone to these processes (Braa et al. 2004) given the extreme involvement of donors, 
vendors and the circulation of money and ICTs. The field of public health informatics and particularly so FOSS 
based, is relatively new and inadequately comprehended by bureaucrats now responsible for taking significant 
investment decisions in this regard. The research aim is to understand how the dynamics of corruption are 
implicated in issues of power and politics within the context of a FOSS based Health Management Information 
System (HMIS) implementation for the public sector in India. 
 
Research Methods 
 
The case study involves the efforts of an Indian NGO (anonymously called INGO) to design, develop and 
implement a FOSS based computerized HMIS package (anonymously called F-HMIS) in the primary health care 
sector in Pradesh (a state in India). Pradesh is one of the most backward states in the country in terms of health 
indicators, physical and ICT infrastructure, and is also known to be politically unstable with a poor record of 
governance. Field work involved the deep involvement of the authors along with the state INGO implementation 
team comprising of about 50 members starting in early 2006 with a situation analysis in a pilot district (an 
administrative unit of a state in India). After successful evaluation of the pilot, the project was extended to all the 24 
districts in the state. The project continued right through till about August 2007, when it was terminated by the state. 
 
The primary research initiative comprised mainly of research and action (Braa et al. 2004) aimed at understanding 
and shaping complex processes of ICT-enabled change in a public health setting of a developing country and their 
impacts (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998; Baskerville 1999). The action research approach helped us to gain 
deeper understanding of the various processes including the appropriate design of the application, dealing with 
infrastructure constraints, capacity building of both the INGO team and of the staff from the health services, and 
developing political advocacy to gain buy in from the state administrators and politicians for the initiative.  
 
At the field level (called Primary Health Centres and Sub Centres1), our emphasis was to seek participation of the 
peripheral health staff to develop more appropriate systems that reflect their needs, and reduce the drudgery of huge 
amounts of manual work relating to processing routine data. Typically about 10-15 Primary Health Centres and 50 
Sub Centers are included in a district, and at the district level the action focus was to ensure that data from all its 
facilities flowed regularly to it, and the processes of aggregation and reporting were carried out. Attempts were also 
made, especially in the more proactive districts, to encourage the analysis of collected data so as to take more 
informed decisions to support health program delivery. At the state level, to where the district data was transmitted 
to, the focus was nearly entirely on encouraging the use of information, and more broadly to spread awareness about 
the value of information for health program management. 
 
                                                           
1 Subcentre is the grassroots level health facility for every 5,000 rural people that is manned by two basic 
healthworkers. There is one mini PHC for every 20,000 rural people that has a medical team with one/two basic 
doctors.In addition, for every 80,000-1,00,000 rural people, there exists a Block PHC/CHC (a first level referral 
centre)having in-patient services and specialist doctors. 
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In the first phase of the project (October 2006 to August 2007), 12 districts were covered with a plan to cover the 
remaining 12 districts in the second phase. The entire process of capacity building, implementation support, hand 
holding and building political endorsement at various administrative levels (of the state, district and sub district) was 
carried out by a multi-level team set up by INGO comprising of about 5 staff (either from informatics or public 
health background) per district, and a 3 member state team for overall technical and administrative coordination. 
The participatory approach adopted was operationalized through the district level teams and involved continuous 
meetings, discussions, and informal spending of time together with the field staff. This helped the INGO team to 
develop closer relationships and a sense of being an “insider” within the Pradesh health system. This insider status 
helped to provide a unique position to understand the action needs, and in collaboration with the health staff be able 
to carry out  interventions (such as required training programs) and review and revise its consequences. This status 
also helped to gain access to the rumors and stories that circulated in the health department, typically laden with 
political and power overtones. While rumors remain rumors and their authenticity can never be completely verified, 
the important point was the manner it was given social meaning by the participants, and often acted upon. For 
example, we heard from the staff about a competing HMIS project initiated by an international agency and the 
improprieties (in vendor selection) that underlined it.  
 
While it is difficult to describe our research process in terms of traditional cycles of action research (Susman & 
Evered 1978; Reason & Bradbury 2001), building trust with staff (especially at the field level) was an important 
basis for the action interventions carried out, often in organic circumstances, and sometimes interrupted through 
political events and conditions beyond our control. The explicit and tacit knowledge (Walsham 2001) gained 
through the participatory action research process was especially useful on the following counts: 
 
1. The design and development of the HMIS application which could be easily used by the field staff, many of 
whom were computer illiterate. 
2. To help develop locally improvised solutions, such as formulating alternative schedules for training to deal with 
the extreme level of power cuts. 
3. The development of locally relevant capacity building approaches such as providing a high focus onthe basics of 
computers. 
 
Data Collection Methods 
 
Data collection during the research process was carried using multiple approaches (Walsham 1995), such as through 
field engagements, study of existing documents such as reporting formats, conducting capacity building of staff, 
communicating with other members of INGO over e-mails, participating in software prototyping, and various 
informal discussions. Field work commenced with the situation analysis in the pilot district in February 2007, in 
which a 2 member INGO team was deployed. There was extensive engagement with the field staff including 
medical doctors and nurses, during which the team tried to understand the different reporting formats, the flow of 
data across the different administrative levels, and the constraints experienced by the staff in carrying out their 
various information processing activities. The INGO team participated in the monthly meetings where the district 
officials met the field staff to discuss the HMIS reports, and through this gained a sense of how the reports were 
used for planning purposes. Participant observations (Whyte 1997) were also conducted during training sessions 
which helped to strengthen the contextual understanding of specific issues, such as the value of traditional data 
sources for improving primary health services. We also provided our comments on the quality of the HMIS such as 
the poor use of health indicators, which was appreciated by the medical doctors and with it helped develop a broader 
awareness of the value of the HMIS.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with state and district staff including of senior bureaucrats, a state 
Minister for parliament, members of concerned NGOs in the state, and IT consultants. For example, we discussed 
with the Minister about the broader political dynamics in the state, and how these influence the posting of senior 
officers like the health secretary. Through these discussions, he also inquired about our project, its progress, and the 
problems we experienced. Subsequently, he “spoke on our behalf” to the officials to support our project, which 
provided further legitimacy to our ongoing action interventions. This was an example of how we tried to use the data 
collection process also as mechanisms for spreading awareness about the project and to enroll other actors in our 
“networks of action” (Braa et al. 2004). During the course of our project spanning nearly 2 years, we enrolled many 
such willing actors such as field health staff, medical officers, NGOs and other entities working in the area, and also 
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the Minister. However, we must admit, similar enrollments could not take place of the health program staff at the 
state level. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Data collection and its analysis proceeded together in interpretive research modes, with no clear demarcation 
between these processes (Myers & Avison 2002), and reflecting the interaction of theoretical concepts with 
empirical data. With increased exposure, and deeper insights into the event under investigation, specific themes start 
to emerge and others started to go into the background. To give an example, starting off the research, we had 
anticipated issues of infrastructure and capacity would be the major challenges we would need to try and address. 
Over time, while we could find some kind of workarounds to these problems, issues of power, politics and the 
underlying corruption started to stare at us in the face. Conceptualizing such issues took us to the literature 
recognizing the deeply entrenched nature of the Indian bureaucracy (Jain & Dwivedi 1990; Montgomery 1974), 
which however does not explicitly consider the issue of corruption. Empirically, these issues became more apparent 
to us as the project went on, and we started to experience and reflect upon the sheer “irrationality” of some of the 
decisions with respect to our project. In order to discern pertinent themes, based on our empirical experiences, we 
documented our individual takes on the issues that we felt were shaping the project. The issue of politics and 
corruption stood out dominantly in our discussions. Within the theme of corruption, trying to understand the “why” 
of it, we started to elaborate on other issues such as related to FOSS, American aid agency dominance, the 
legitimized practices in the bureaucracy of taking favors for gaining support for the project, and similar such 
reasons. Various events kept taking place, such as the transfer of a visionary Health Secretary who was supporting 
our project which coincided with the change of the state government. This made us wonder about the link between 
the bureaucracy and the politicians. 
 
Later we understood, these events were linked as the official was seen to be “sympathetic” towards the outgoing 
government. The ongoing saga of the non-payment of project costs by the health department to INGO, and the 
dynamics around it further helped us to understand systems of legitimized practices in the health department, and the 
manner in which corruption seemed to be institutionally legitimized and embedded. These analytical insights were 
further enrichened through readings, both the popular press and academic literature. For example, an eminent 
economist writing an article in a leading newspaper summarized the larger face of corruption in the country. 
“Ostensibly to help farmers, the 11th five-year plan allocates nearly $50 billion to surface irrigation… This will be a 
huge waste of money on obsolete, ineffective irrigation concepts dating from the19th century … India must abandon 
its exiting strategy … This will disappoint crooked politicians and bureaucrats used to getting huge kickbacks …” 
(Aiyar, Times of India, May 4, 2008, New Delhi). 
 
In summary, data analysis involved a process with multiple facets. Firstly, was our ongoing fieldwork, and joint 
discussions with team members and also health department staff on these experiences, which continued to give 
various insights. Secondly, was discussions with members of the broader civil society such as politicians and NGOs 
that helped us to gain an understanding of the broader context and how deep rooted issues of corruption were. 
Engaging with ongoing events, such as non-payment and change of governments, in a sense provided us with “on-
line” insights that gave great sharpness to the data analysis process. Readings of popular press (magazines and 
newspapers) was especially useful, and we found the academic literature to be generally wanting on the explicit 
treatment of this topic. 
 
The Case Study 
 
The case study is set in Pradesh (an anonymous name of an Indian state), amongst one of the poorest states in the 
country, with very weak infrastructures of roads, computers and electricity, a high percentage of illiteracy, and a 
public health system where many a times even buildings and basic sanitary, water and other conditions are not 
available in many of the health facilities. Pradesh is also reputed to have a rather unstable political structure with 
frequent changes of power, and a bureaucratic system that is reputedly corrupt with institutionalized systems of 
demanding payments of a percentage of project costs as bribes for obtaining official sanction. Systems of political 
and social patronage, a product of the historically existing feudal system in the state, were dominant in many spheres 
such as recruitment, transfers of staff, obtaining official permissions, and in procurement. As a historical response to 
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this feudal structure, Pradesh has over the years also seen the growth of quite a strong insurgent movement that is 
armed and which obstensibly seeks to fight for the rights (especially land related) of the poor and marginalized. 
 
Within this context, the initial efforts to commence HMIS in the public sector of Pradesh came when one of the 
authors of the paper (who originally belonged to Pradesh) approached the Health Secretary there and expressed his 
desire to explore the possibility of introducing computer based HMIS in the state. In this meeting, this author (who 
was representing INGO, a not-for-profit NGO) explained about the origins of the F-HMIS (Free- HMIS), an 
initiative originating from an European University in 1994, and its current spread to more than 15 countries in the 
developing world, including India. Further, it was bought to the attention of the Secretary that this project was based 
on FOSS, and currently was also ongoing in some other Indian states. The Secretary was a very enlightened person 
and a visionary, and quickly saw the value of the proposal, especially the global knowledge and best practices which 
could come in through the F-HMIS network. He provided permission to develop a pilot project in one district nearby 
the state capital, the cost of which would be borne by INGO. So, quite in contrast to how commonly projects were 
initiated in Pradesh, this project was selected on its technical merits and the potential global knowledge it would 
bring in to a marginalized state. For this, the visionary health Secretary could be credited. 
 
Following the permission provided by the Secretary, a pilot project was initiated in which two project employees set 
up base in the pilot district, and over the next 4 months made a detailed study of the health information flows from 
the community to the state through the various intermediate levels, the infrastructure available and other constraints. 
A prototype HMIS was quickly created by the team based on a FOSS application, and quite rapidly the health staff 
started to be trained on entering their data and generating reports. When the evaluation of the pilot was carried out 
after 4 months by the health secretary, he was pleased by the fact that for the first time during his tenure he could see 
data from the lowest level (of the sub centre) of service delivery, and that the data entry had been carried out by the 
health staff, and not through external and contracted data entry operators as was normally the case. This bore good 
signs for future sustainability of efforts for the project in the state. Based on this positive evaluation, a 5-year 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between the health department of Pradesh and INGO. As per the 
MOU, the 24 districts in the state were to be covered in two phases of 12 districts each, with the first stretching over 
9 months, followed by the next cohort, and a period of joint consolidation. The hardware supply responsibility was 
that of the State, and INGO had the responsibility to provide services towards software customization and support, 
capacity building and implementation support. Ninety percent of the budgeted costs were towards paying salaries to 
the trainers who were to be hired by INGO for developing capacity of the health staff, and the rest 10% towards 
organizational maintenance and overhead expenses. Such a budgeting model was made possible because of the use 
of FOSS, and stood in stark contrast to typical HMIS computerization projects where about 90% of the costs are 
towards hardware and software and the rest on capacity building (Raghvendra & Sahay 2006).  
 
After the signing of the MOU, the first efforts of INGO were to create a team of about 60 system facilitators who 
would be responsible for capacity building of the health staff at the facilities, and providing all kinds of 
implementation support and hand holding. Given the backward status of Pradesh and that many of the young 
educated people would go away to Delhi for employment opportunities, finding such people was not an easy task. 
However, we were determined to find and train this group as we felt that would be a very big incentive for Pradesh 
more broadly (not just the health sector) to create this pool of trained entrepreneurs who then on could more broadly 
contribute to bridge the “digital divide” in the state and strengthen socio-economic development processes. Further, 
in this team we consciously tried to incorporate a fair percentage of women in the team, again with the broader aim 
of contributing to women empowerment. Politically, that was our approach to be locally embedded and not to be 
seen as “outsiders.” 
 
Once the team was in place, we requested for a letter from the state office addressed to the different health facilities 
(including 102 PHCs2 that were to be covered in the first phase) that the F-HMIS project had been initiated, and that 
the System Facilitators would be assigned to particular facilities, and the department should provide full support to 
them. The state was responsible for the installation of the hardware in the facilities, and as per the MOU this had to 
be done within one month from the signing of the agreement. However, given the eisting bureaucratic systems of 
procurement in the department, there were huge delays in the process, and the facilitators who were already now in 
the facilities started to become impatient waiting for the computers to arrive. To tide over this problem, and also to 
help give the facilitators a better sense and feel of what HMIS is about, we created paper formats in which all the 
data items that needed to be collected were listed (this ran into more than 10 pages), and columns were designed to 
enter data for the 12 months of the financial year (from April 2006 to March 2007). We then asked the facilitators to 
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take one set of this format to each facility and in collaboration with the staff there, obtain the paper records of the 
health data for the last 12 months and fill it in the created format. This process started, and served as a useful site for 
mutual learning, for the health staff to understand about the project and build trust with the INGO team, and for the 
facilitators to gain insights into the working of a health facility, the nature of the data that constitutes the HMIS; and 
understand problems in the existing data. 
 
A health facility typically collects data on about 1500 data elements per month, so trying to find all the manual 
records, entering it in the structure of the paper sheets for various months was an extremely time taking task lasting 
many months. This was achieved only through the extreme cooperation of the health staff and the deep dedication of 
the F-HMIS team who were personally committed to contribute to the development of the state. In the meanwhile, 
the F-HMIS state level team kept following up with the officials there on the supply of the computers. Reasons such 
as the official requirements of a tendering process etc. were cited for the delay, and always we were assured it would 
be done soon. Finally, about 3 months into the project, the HMIS consultant of the state found 32 unused computers 
in the state warehouse and took the initiative to have them dispatched to 32 facilities (out of the designated 102). 
Many of these machines were not as per the specifications for the hardware that had been specified in the MOU, and 
many of the supplies were incomplete (without the UPS or the printer for example). While of course we lodged our 
note about these issues officially with the state, we were at least glad that in 32 facilities’ training could be started 
for the facility staff using the computers. For the other facilities, we used locally improvised solutions to meet the 
gaps, such as using the district machine for training of the PHC staff or by renting a machine. We found many 
willing district offices, and took permission from the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) there to install the software, and 
start to conduct training programs. The CMO in nearly all cases were extremely willing for this as they were excited 
that computers would be used for their district. In some districts where the computers did not exist, we on our own 
initiative hired computers to help initiate similar processes there. 
 
Response from the state on further supply of computers continued to be one of procrastination, and as was the 
practice in the state, we carried on to write official reminder letters to place the issues on record. In the meanwhile, 
our mixed approach to data collection (combination of facility and district based training) was moving very well, 
and about 6 months into the project, we had collected nearly 90-95% of all the required paper data, and started to 
enter that into the computers. Different means were used for data entry, either through the staff in the facilities, or 
through the INGO system facilitators, and in other cases through contracted data entry operators. Ideally, we would 
have wanted all the data entry to have been done by the health staff, for reasons of sustainability as had been 
demonstrated in the pilot, but circumstances did not allow us. 
 
On issues of money, as per the MOU, a first installment had to be paid to us with the signing of the agreement, and 
subsequently quarterly payments were earmarked. We got the first installment as scheduled, and as the time came 
for subsequent payments, we started to write official request letters. It should be pointed out that the health secretary 
who had initiated the project was transferred soon after the signing of the MOU. This transfer came about because 
there had been a political change in the ruling party, and the secretary who was seen aligned to the party now out of 
power, was transferred from health to a more remote department. That was a real blow to the project, as in him we 
had found someone who was visionary and to whom we could clearly express the issues we faced. Adding further 
confusion to the question of leadership was the fact that in the following 3-4 months, there were at least 3 different 
secretaries who were posted to position and soon rapidly transferred due to political reasons. There was thus a 
complete and repeated disruption in the project, and with it we found no action being taken on our request for 
installment payments or the supply of computers. Further, we also found no one in the state to whom we could 
demonstrate the field implementation progress, and to take state level ownership. As months started to pass, and our 
resources more depleted, we begun to become worried about how we would pay the salaries of our staff, who were 
now slowly becoming more agitated. 
 
As we built trust with many of the health department staff, we started to gain access to rumors and stories about the 
“gory HMIS arena” in the state, and also the dominating influence of a large North American international donor on 
various affairs of the state. We heard that some years ago, the then health secretary had contracted an American 
agency for the development of a HMIS application in one district, and the cost of which was about twice of ours 
even though we were covering 24 districts and over a five year period. We were also told that a large sum of the 
contracted amount had already been paid to the agency even though the work had not been completed. On a separate 
visit to the district where this agency had worked, we could not find a working system, or users of the system. 
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People alluded to comments of others “yes, I think something is going on, but not sure what.” We later came to 
understand why in our MOU, only 24 districts were included and not 25 since the 25th (which incidentally was the 
capital of Pradesh) was seen to be within the purview of the American influence and the prior secretary. 
Incidentally, we had been in touch also with the Minister of Parliament (MP) from the state, whose political 
constituency interestingly corresponded to this 25th excluded district. He was happy that our global project on a 
missionary zeal was being implemented in his state, but kept asking us to also deploy the systems in the health 
facilities of his district. When we told him the reasons why we could not, he wrote a letter to the Chief Minister and 
Health Minister of the state asking for an explanation why his district had been excluded from the project. No 
response was ever received on this. In the meanwhile, our resources were now completely depleted, and we could 
not even pay the salaries of our staff for more than 4 months. The staff because of their commitment to the project, 
and desire to make it succeed, continued to work unflinchingly in the field even without their salaries. In the 
meanwhile, our continued approaches through letters and personal meetings with the concerned officials bore no 
results. The department staff used various time wasting measures to put us off, for example by asking reports of 
work done (even though they already were given in many times). At one point, it was told to us that our project was 
not legal as the health department had signed the MOU with INGO without due process – implying that no tendering 
process took place and also no approvals of the governing council were taken. We argued those issues were the 
department’s internal issues nor our problems, and that we were acting on a legal MOU signed between us and them, 
and had delivered as agreed. 
 
Through the Member of Parliament mentioned earlier, we requested him to intervene in the matter. After extreme 
pressure being put on the health officials, they invited us to make a presentation of the overall project to the 
governing council. Given the severity of the issue (that now 60 facilitators had not been paid for 4 months), one of 
the authors came from Europe to make this presentation. In the meeting, various issues were discussed, and the 
meeting was completely dominated by the American representatives. By the time it came to the INGO presentation, 
the Secretary said he needed to leave, and instead said that an “expert committee” would be delegated to examine 
the status of our project and submit a report to him in one week and he would then take necessary action. As things 
turned out, the setting up of the committee, their analysis and submission of report took close to two months. But the 
report unanimously applauded the success achieved by the project, and strongly recommended that it should be 
quickly expanded to the whole state and all back payments should be made. Despite this, no payments were paid, 
and more innovative methods of delays were constructed. For example, they even went to the extent of asking for an 
audit statement of the money that was due to us. To this we responded that it was illegal for us to provide audited 
statements of money that had not been received. Then they asked us again to give them the soft copy of the data, 
which we again provided. In the meanwhile, through various informal sources and rumors we were encouraged to 
offer a bribe to the department, as there were fixed percentages (15%) which needed to be mandatorily paid if any 
payment was to be received. We decided not to do that for both moral reasons, and also we did not trust that the 
department would pay us even after receiving the bribe. 
 
Then we were told that the financial year ending was coming and we would need to be paid now or never. One day 
before the year ending (30th March 2008), we received a fax saying that our project was being terminated and a new 
tender would be issued. We were told to collect our payment for work done till June 2007, and no explanation was 
given on how June was marked as termination date. Interestingly, it was written also in the letter that because of the 
conflicts between two past health secretaries, it was not possible to continue the project. In aftermath, the story was 
that the health secretary who initiated our project (say HS 1) was in public conflict with an earlier health secretary 
(say HS2) who had given the contract of one district to the American firm mentioned earlier. However, after HS1 
left the health department, HS2 became the Chief Secretary (head of all Secretaries), and apparently opposed our 
project since it originated from HS1. In the meanwhile, HS1 filed corruption charges against HS2 for various cases 
(including involving the HMIS project of the 25th district). This conflict between HS1 and HS2 gained headlines in 
the national press with HS2 being charged. Anyway, the repercussion of that has been our project was closed, and 
still our due money (not even the partial amount deemed payable by the end of the year fax mentioned earlier) was 
not paid. The file currently languishes in the drawer of the official who has to sign the cheque, apparently waiting 
for some “incentive” before the signing takes place. INGO is now in the process of initiating legal proceedings 
against the State Health Department. 
 
Case Analysis 
 
The Dynamics of Corruption and ICT Projects: Case Study from the Public Health System in India 
10 Twenty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, Paris 2008  
As described in the case study, an expert committee set up by the State Health Secretary evaluated the INGO HMIS 
implementation in Pradesh as a success and recommended its urgent scaling up. Some of the medical officers in the 
districts also wrote to the State department expressing their appreciation of the INGO project and the need to 
strengthen support to it. Apart from these formal notes, various health staff and medical officers from PHCs, CHCs 
and districts, with whom we had established close working relations, were extremely pleased with the improvements 
brought in, especially in streamlining their monthly health data management processes. Earlier, the manual reporting 
systems were not only fragmented but also functioned sketchily. The field data was frequently “modified” at various 
levels by the health staff (PHC, district etc) to show that targets had been met, and similarly the state officials would 
convey to the concerned bureaucrats and politicians (at the central level) the successful functioning of their state 
health programs. In the 12 districts covered by the project, as the computer based HMIS began to replace the manual 
reporting systems, the technical security features of “locking,” made it difficult to create “modifications” to the data. 
 
The above-mentioned “success” was achieved by INGO despite the extremely adverse circumstances such as 
delayed and non-supply of hardware of appropriate quality. Out of 102 PHCs, PCs were set up only in 32 facilities, 
of which some were unserviceable right from the beginning. The PCs were out of warranty period, and with no 
AMC. There was also the lack of Internet connectivity, and hence data transfers had to be carried out manually 
starting off from PHCs through CDs, manually carried by the INGO team members. Power supply was extremely 
intermittent and the generators often were earmarked for use only for medical emergencies. Dealing with this 
condition required creating schedules for training, sometime outside normal working hours, to take advantage of 
available power supply. 
 
Non-payment of dues was another major problem, with 40% being released at the very start, and no further funds as 
stipulated in MOU were ever made available to INGO. This long overdue non-payment severely impeded progress 
of work as since May 2007 neither the facilitator salaries could be paid nor travel in the field could be supported.  
Although, INGO attempted to transfer minimal funds on loan from their ongoing projects in several other states, this 
had to be stopped because all projects were taken up not-for-profit. Another key problem was the lack of ownership 
assumed by the State health authorities who seemed to express an attitude to somehow abandon this project and re-
tender it, probably to gain larger financial support from international funding agencies, like the American one 
currently active in the state. The magnitude of the project cost that the State paid to implement a HMIS in one 
district (the 25th one described earlier) provides insights into “what is in store” for the officials provided the “right” 
agency is allocated a state-wide IS project. The success of F-HMIS was also informally confirmed by the IT 
consultant working in the state health department, on whose laptop the health databases were being installed and 
regularly updated. While he privately applauded the achievements of the project, he had little power to influence 
decision making at the top. Firstly, he himself was a consultant on a temporary contract and thus could not dare rock 
the boat in fear of his own job. Two, he was seen as a technocrat, while the locus of decision making was centered 
within the administrative circles.  
 
Our analysis emphasized that there is a deep and irreconcilable chasm between the political and technical domains, 
as seen from the perspective of the state and their evaluation of the project. The technical success of the project 
seemed to have no influence on the political decision makers, whose primary motivation seemed to come from other 
sources. Scholars like Beck et al. (2004) have analyzed the continuation of the digital divide amongst marginalized 
communities in LDCs, for example, through reasons of lack of access to the Internet and human capacity. Beck et al. 
(2004) further argue that this acute divide does not exist merely because of the above reasons alone but also due the 
lack of abilities amongst poor people to innovate and effectively use ICTs in their local circumstances, and being 
linked to local issues and concerns. Our case points to some other reasons. Yes, there are infrastructure constraints, 
but these are not insurmountable, and with team work and local innovation, problems can be addressed, though not 
in technically optimal ways. Further, we showed that the capacity to innovate and find local solutions are really 
present in marginalized communities – because they need it most to find improvised solutions all the time to deal 
with the historically deprived circumstances in which they live.  
 
Contributing to the shaping the trajectory of the project in Pradesh were a number of conditions ranging from 
inadequate infrastructure, weak human resources capacity, poor governance, and a highly volatile political and 
administrative structure. While acknowledging the above, we have primarily focused our analysis to the issue of 
corruption as we see it significant, affecting other issues, and yet largely ignored from discussions and action. We 
use the term of “networks of corruption” to emphasize the interlinked nature of these processes and the manner in 
which they are institutionally embedded.  
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This network comprises of various actors including the administration, the political structure, the international donor 
agencies, the IT vendors, and others. Network linkages take place through different mechanisms, some of which we 
discuss here. The first concerns “hard corruption,” involving the transfer of money to decision makers for promoting 
a particular project. In bureaucratic systems like in Pradesh, corruption is a historical legacy of the feudal system 
and the civil and administrative services, and over time, this form of hard corruption has become a deeply embedded 
institutionalized practice, and one which is nearly impossible to dislodge. The second concerns the use of FOSS, 
which seems to be resisted because there are no apparently financial strings attached to its purchase and uptake. The 
cost comparisons of the F-HMIS project in 24 districts with the American agency project in one district provides a 
clear evidence to this point. 
 
Thirdly, corruption is not just a state subject but is something that is promoted and maintained by international 
agencies who have their fingers in “many pies.” The American agency in our case had been active on various kinds 
of health related projects in Pradesh, including HMIS. Since they have the state health officials within their grasp, 
their influence is exercised through many means, such as granting favors to the agency they want. In this way, a 
corrupt nexus gets created involving international donors, state officials, and local vendors, and built around the use 
of proprietary systems. Reinforcing these above identified issues is the extremely unstable political structure which 
leaves little room for accountability. Projects are started, undue favors are received, project outcomes not evaluated 
on technical merit, and failures brushed under the carpet as the bureaucrat who has initiated the project has been 
moved to another setting. The frequent changes of the political parties have direct repercussions on the bureaucracy, 
further contributing to this ambiguity. These changes have sometimes the effect of moving out good officers, and in 
other cases, the opposite. In summary, the macro level politics and corruption are deeply and intricately intertwined 
with the micro-level project dynamics, with significant implications. In this paper, we have tried to trace some of 
these macro-micro linkages. The issue of FOSS and the “not for profit” form of INGO in our case, empirically was 
seen to be something that invited resistance because of the lack of monetary benefits associated with it. 
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
 
Corruption, within the context of ICT projects in LDCs, is no simple matter of an “improper” transaction between 
two individuals, but is situated within a “network of corruption” with both inter-connected structural and process 
features. Through our analysis, the following linkages are identified: 
 
1. Systems of international funding create structures of asymmetrical relations and dependencies between the 
recipient and donors contributing to corrupt practices. For example, a vendor favored by the donor had to 
be given a contract for a HMIS project in one district at an exorbitant cost by the health department. 
2. Structures of governance in which the bureaucrats are often subservient to the politicians means that 
officers are often transferred at the whims and fancies of the politicians. This adversely influences the 
continuity and sustainability of ICT projects.  
3. Structures of procurement in government have delays and procedures in built in them, and going around 
them to speeden implementation inevitably requires the exchange of undue favors.  
4. There are institutionally legitimized structures of paying a “% fee” in return for project related payments. 
Failure to adhere to this practice, as in the case of INGO, meant that their payments were held up, leading 
ultimately to the closure of the project.  
 
Corruption, as a research topic, because of its very nature, tends not to be explicitly discussed. Further, it is not easy 
to get “data” on, as hardly will ever respondents discuss this topic, and neither would it be stated in formal reports 
and presentations. It is thus elusive but still permeates widely in the context of health sector projects in LDCs. Often, 
from the West the view is taken that the officials and bureaucrats in LDCs are corrupt and responsible for the 
failures of ICT related projects. But, we argue that this is an incomplete view, as what gives corruption a voice is the 
“networks of corruption” that take shape, and its structural and process characteristics. Viewed in this perspective, 
international donor agencies can be seen to be equally responsible as the local government officials in promoting a 
corrupt practice. These networks include aid agencies, government officials, technology vendors, which often find 
patronage through politicians. In trying to understand some of these dynamics of corruption, the paper contributes to 
research in IS in LDCs by firstly trying to practically trace some of its implications on projects, and secondly, by 
providing a richer contextual understanding of a FOSS based HMIS project.  
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